Massachusetts Criminal Defense Lawyer Blog

Brockton criminal defense lawyer reviews recent case discussing waiver of Miranda rights

September 23, 2013 | by Michael DelSignore

As a Brockton Criminal Defense Lawyer, many times when I review a case for the first time, I see that a defendant has made a damaging admission. Often, suppression of the statement is critical to a successful defense at trial.

Because of the importance of a defendant’s Miranda rights and the incriminatory effect that a waiver of these rights might have, the State is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant waived his rights knowingly, intelligently, and willingly. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court recently reviewed the issue of whether a defendant who ingested cocaine two days before turning himself in on a murder charge and who alleged to have no recollection of the crime made a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his Miranda rights. In Commonwealth v. Stevie Walker, the Court considered the defendant’s waiver within the entire context in which it was made, including an examination of the defendant’s conduct, age, education, intelligence, emotional stability, criminal history, physical and mental condition, and the manner the waiver was obtained.

Walker was a suspect in the fatal stabbing of a victim in her apartment on the afternoon of November 4, 2005. Earlier that morning, Walker admitted to have been at a friend’s apartment located one floor below the victim’s apartment, smoking crack cocaine with his friend. The defendant and his friend fell asleep, and then awoke in the afternoon, at which point the defendant smoked more cocaine. After having left the apartment between 2 and 3 P.M., the defendant allegedly went up to the victim’s apartment and fatally stabbed the victim. He was discovered by the building manager in the victim’s bathroom, near the victim who was lying under a rug on the floor with a kitchen-knife protruding from her neck. The building manager wrestled with the defendant to prevent his escape, but the defendant overcame her and fled using an emergency exit.

The defendant claiming to have recently awoken with blood “all over”. The defendant told the officers he was there to turn himself in. The officers arrested the defendant and read him his Miranda rights which the defendant acknowledged understanding. The officer than asked the defendant if he had been drinking or using drugs, and the defendant responded, “Not in a while.” The defendant was read his Miranda rights two more times, and the defendant initialed a document with his rights listed, and printed his name on a waiver form, confirming that he understood he was waiving his rights.

During the interview with detectives later that morning, the defendant did not confess to stabbing the victim but claimed that he had just woken up inside a locked storage room and found blood all over him. He claimed to have had no recollection of the events since smoking cocaine at his friend’s apartment “a few days ago.” The defense sought to argue that the defendant was mentally debilitated when he waived his Miranda rights, and offered the expert testimony of two psychologists who examined the defendant and diagnosed him with having an unspecified personality disorder with paranoid and schiz-atypical attributes, as well as with cocaine dependence.

Despite the evidence presented by the defense, the Court concluded that there was no evidence that the defendant’s will was overborn when he chose to waive his Miranda rights. Defendant confirmed at the police station that he understood his rights several times, and that he had knowingly, intelligently, and willingly chosen to waive them.

The SJC also found that the officers did not observe any indication from the defendant’s conduct or speech that he was in any way impaired. Given these findings, in addition to the fact that the officers confirmed that he had eleven years of education and a prior criminal record indicating his familiarity with Miranda rights, the Court held the waiver to be valid.

Among the most important factors in the Court’s determination was the defendant’s seemingly unimpaired behavior, as observed by the police officers. The defendant had demonstrated that he was fully conscious of his surroundings and his decisions. Not only was he aware of his statements, but he was even selective in denying certain snacks and drinks offered to him during the interview. Although the defendant had a cocaine dependency had only awoken minutes before with no recollection of the past days’ events, his overall conduct was the determinative factor.
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Rhode Island Superior Court Judge refuses to sever trial of defense lawyer

September 20, 2013 | by Michael DelSignore

The Trial of two Rhode Island Criminal Defense Lawyers charged with conspiracy, bribery and obstruction of justice raises the issue of when two defendants can be tried together. As an Attleboro criminal defense lawyer, this trial has raised interesting issue of the joint trial of two defendants and when a judge should recuse himself from hearing a case.

The Providence Superior Court found itself addressing these very same circumstances after the Grand Jury indicted a stabbing suspect, his defense attorney, and a second defense attorney with obstructing administration of justice, conspiracy to obstruct the judicial system, bribery of a witness and conspiracy to bribe a witness. After sentencing one of the attorneys to six years imprisonment for his role in the conspiracy on September 11, the court refused to sever the second attorney’s proceedings from the stabbing suspect.

Defense attorney Donna Uhlmann is now preparing to stand alongside stabbing suspect Jamaal Dublin during the trial scheduled for September 23, 2013. Ms. Uhlmann and Mr. Dublin are accused of conspiring to bribe a witness that Mr. Dublin allegedly stabbed to prevent him from testifying against Mr. Dublin. Mr. Dublin’s lawyer urged the court to sever his trial from Ms. Uhlmann’s because he anticipates that much of the evidence that will be raised would be against the defense attorney, Ms. Uhlmann, and so would confuse the jurors from being able to differentiate between the actions of the defense attorney and the actions of Mr. Dublin.

Massachusetts Supreme Court holds that ineffective assistance of counsel claims based on failure to advise defendant of immigration consequences can be brought for case decided prior to Padilla

September 17, 2013 | by Michael DelSignore

The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held in Commonwealth v. Sylvain that ineffective assistance of counsel claims based on the failure to advise a defendant of the immigration consequences of a criminal conviction can be brought prior to the Padilla decision under Article 12. The SJC declined to follow the recent decision of the United States Supreme Court holding that ineffective assistance of counsel claims could only be made for case decided after Padilla. Since Padilla, it has been the obligation of every Massachusetts criminal defense lawyer to advise any defendant of the immigration consequences of any plea in a criminal case.

SJC Rejects the reasoning of Chaidez.

The U.S. Supreme Court issued a decision in Chaidez v. United States finding that the right to counsel on the deportation consequences of a guilty plea expressed in Padilla was in fact a “new” rule, and so applies only to convictions finalized after the Padilla decision (after 2010). Thus, according to Chaidez, Mr. Sylvain is not eligible for the relief under Padilla since he was convicted and sentenced in 2007.

Connecticut Drivers facing OUI charge in Massachusetts will have assignment to Connecticut Diversionary Program count as a conviction for purposes of breath test refusal suspension

September 16, 2013 | by Michael DelSignore

The Massachusetts Court of Appeals addressed an important question for Connecticut Drivers charged with DUI in Massachusetts in the case of Thomas Scheffler v. Board of Appeals. The Appeals Court held that a driver’s assignment to a diversionary program, which is not considered a DUI Conviction in Connecticut, does count as a like offense for the purposes of determining whether the Massachusetts Registry of Motor Vehicles will issue a license suspension.

In 2009, Mr. Thomas Scheffler was charged in Connecticut for operating under the influence of liquor, in violation of a Connecticut statute. Because Mr. Scheffler refused a breathalyzer test, his license was suspended for six months. However, the OUI charge was dismissed upon Mr. Scheffler’s completion of a pretrial alcohol education diversion program, in compliance with another state statute.

Almost two months later, the RMV notified Mr. Scheffler that his license would be suspended for one year based on the Connecticut OUI charge. Despite being later informed that Mr. Scheffler’s license was actually suspended for refusing a breathalyzer, and that the OUI charge was dismissed following completion of the diversion program, the RMV did not clear Mr. Scheffler’s record. Instead, his record now reflects both the breathalyzer refusal and the OUI dismissal, in addition to the completed alcohol education program.

Massachusetts drug distribution conviction upheld despite Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause Challenge

September 13, 2013 | by Michael DelSignore

The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court recently ruled in the case of Commonwealth v. Robert Lezynski, decided on August 2, 2013, that the defendant’s conviction of possession of Class B drug with the intent to distribute was not influenced by an improperly admitted toxicology report in violation of the Sixth Amendment. As a Massachusetts Criminal Defense Lawyer, the Sixth Amendment demands face to face confrontation and this right must be vigorously safeguarded when the Commonwealth tries to admit testimonial evidence through another witness.

In the matter of Commonwealth v. Lezynski, prosecutors sought to convict Mr. Lezynski of possession and distribution of fentanyl patches at a party. The prosecutors presented eye witnesses who testified to having observed Mr. Lezynski with the patches and giving some to one of the guests, who died shortly thereafter. The victim had smoked marijuana before the party and was heavily intoxicated from drinking that night, causing acute fentanyl and alcohol intoxication. The prosecutors also presented toxicology reports of the victim’s blood, and sought to admit them into evidence through the director of forensic toxicology at one of the labs that analyzed the victim’s blood. Mr. Lezynski’s attorney did not object.

Mr. Lezynski was indicted on manslaughter and possession with intent to distribute a class B controlled substance. The jury convicted Mr. Lezynski of possession and distribution, and Mr. Lezynski subsequently appealed.

Challenge to Accuracy of Breath Test Results in Pennsylvania heading to the State Supreme Court

September 10, 2013 | by Michael DelSignore

Unlike under Massachusetts OUI Law, in some jurisdictions, the statutory penalties of driving under the influence vary depending on blood-alcohol measurements as determined by a breathalyzer exam or blood test. While trial courts across the nation are becoming increasingly skeptical of breathalyzers, the Pennsylvania Superior Court recently reversed a trial judge’s decision to dismiss a heightened DUI charge on a finding that breathalyzers are inaccurate. In Massachusetts, the statutory penalties are essentially the same regardless of the breath test results other than for drivers under 21 and other than the additional requirement of an alcohol assessment; of course, a judge is likely to impose a harsher punishment with a higher breath test result.

Last December a trial judge in Pennsylvania rejected a prosecutor’s attempts to prove the defendant, in the case of State v. Schildt, guilty of a heightened DUI statutory charge by presenting results from a breath test as evidence of the defendant having a BAC reading of 0.16 percent. A reading of 0.16 percent or greater qualifies a defendant in Pennsylvania for the maximum penalty under the DUI statute, with increased prison time and fines.

After hearing arguments from both parties, Judge Lawrence Clark Jr. ruled that breathalyzers are not scientifically accurate beyond a 0.15% blood-alcohol reading. Judge Clark Jr. then concluded that without an accurate blood-alcohol reading, the State will not be able to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant Schildt was so intoxicated so as to qualify him for the heightened statutory sentence. He therefore dismissed the charge.

What is the look back for prior OUI offenses in Massachusetts?

September 8, 2013 | by Michael DelSignore

Under Massachusetts OUI law, there is a lifetime look back for prior OUI offenses. This simply means that the level of offense you will be charged with will be based on the total number of OUI convictions you have in your lifetime. It is important when you speak to an OUI Lawyer in Massachusetts that you tell your attorney about all prior convictions you have even if unknown to the district attorney.

Those convictions can be taken from Massachusetts or from any other state where the conviction is for a DUI. The only issue is whether the offense for a DUI in another state is similar to our statute, which we refer to as an OUI. For Example, if a motorist was convicted of DWI in Georgia 7 years ago, but this fact is unknown to the district attorney, even though the offense would be considered a first offense by the court, the RMV would treat the offense as a second offense.

Some states have a look back for prior offenses, meaning that in those states those courts will only consider a prior offense if it happened within a certain time period. The time period varies with the State, it could be five years, some states use 10 or 15 years.

Understanding the Court Procedure in Massachusetts Superior and District Court in the Aaron Hernandez Case

September 4, 2013 | by Michael DelSignore

The case of Aaron Hernandez reveals some interesting aspects of Massachusetts’s court procedures. For example, many people wonder why Hernandez is being arraigned again in superior court. The reason lies in the fact that there are typically two arraignments in any superior court charge. Hernandez was initially arraigned in the Attleboro district court, as all cases most cases start in district court. As an Attleboro criminal defense lawyer, Hernandez’s case proceed through the district court in the normal fashion, with typically one or more continuance of the probable cause hearing which occurred in this case. On September 6th, Hernandez will be arraigned in the Fall River Superior Court where the case will remain until a verdict or plea on the charges or on amended charges.

As there was enough probable cause to issue a criminal complaint against him and the charges consisted of allegations that could not remain in district court, an arraignment in superior court is the next step. This is because the district court simply has no final jurisdiction over a charge of first degree murder.

What jurisdiction does the district court have?

Will there be video of an OUI Arrest in East Bridgewater, Massachusetts

August 29, 2013 | by Michael DelSignore

If you were arrested for OUI in East Bridgewater, there should be video of your OUI arrest. the video that the police have will be referred to as a booking video. The East Bridgewater police department does not have a police cruiser camera video. There are a few departments that have cruiser camera, but the majority do not. As an East Bridgewater OUI Lawyer, there was a recent case of interest if a video is lost by the Government.

Police cruisers tare equipped with video recording devices to capture police stops and patrols. When the driver of a vehicle is facing OUI charges, a recording of the stop and arrest may be presented in court by the defendant to challenge the arrest. In such circumstances, the video is considered exculpatory evidence since it may clear the defendant of guilt.

Dismissal Upheld in Recent case where video is lost:

Ohio Ruling finding breath test evidence unreliable

August 26, 2013 | by Michael DelSignore

As a , anytime a person comes into the office after having failed the breath test, I know that I will have to explain to them why the breath test machine can be unreliable and ways the case can be won despite the breath test results. While breath test evidence must be challenged, these results do not mean the case cannot be won in court. In this Blog, we will review a decision from Ohio finding the breath test machine unreliable.

A prominent trial judge in Ohio has just decided that the results of the Intoxilyzer 8000 “are not scientifically reliable.”

On August 14, 2013, in the matter of State v. Lancaster, Judge Teresa Liston concluded proceedings that lasted over the span of several months challenging the reliability of the Intoxilyzer 8000 in the Marietta Municipal Court in Ohio. Judge Liston, a well-respected retired judge, was called to the bench specifically to hear several cases combined by the court for the purposes of challenging the Intoxilyzer 8000 alone.