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An OUI trial in Massachusetts is governed by rules and laws that allow and prohibit certain statements, reports, and objects from admission into evidence. Once a statement or item is admitted into evidence, it may be considered by the judge or jury for the purposes of reaching a verdict. In Com. v. Schutte, the MA Court of Appeals considered the admissibility of a doctor’s report which corroborated the defendant’s own testimony that he was suffering from an impairment that caused him to fail his sobriety tests.

The defendant in this case was pulled over after the officer observed him driving erratically on the road. The officer testified that he had smelt alcohol, and asked the defendant whether he had been drinking. The defendant replied that he a couple of bears. The officer then decided to conduct field sobriety tests.

The officer administered the alphabet test, and then asked the defendant to perform the one-legged stand and the walk-and-pivot test. The defendant passed the alphabet test, but before taking the remaining two tests, informed the officer that he had thirteen ear operations which effect his equilibrium. Despite this admission, the officer allowed the defendant to take the remaining two tests – and the defendant lost his balance in both.

The owner of the International Polo Club Palm Beach, Mr. John Goodman, recently took the stand to testify in his own criminal trial on an OUI manslaughter charge in Florida. Goodman was operating his Bentley in 2010 when he collided with the 23 year old man Scott Wilson in his motor vehicle, causing Wilson’s death.

Goodman testified that he was not intoxicated at the time of operation, although he admitted to having drank multiple alcoholic beverages immediately before the collision. According to Goodman, he was at a party where he consumed alcohol, purchased alcohol for his friends, but was nonetheless sober when he got behind the wheel of his Bentley to purchase a frosty from a local Wendy’s restaurant. Rather, what caused him to lose control of the vehicle colliding with Wilson was faulty breaks in the Bentley.

Goodman was tested following the accident, and had a BAC level of twice the legal limit. Goodman explained that he actually became intoxicated after the accident, when he left the scene of the accident and drank heavily at a nearby location throughout that night. And in his second trial, he offered witness testimony corroborating this explanation. The bartender of the bar where Goodman was drinking before the accident may also be called to testify as to Goodman’s sobriety at the time of the accident.

On October 6, the U.S. Supreme Court heard arguments from defense counsel, the North Carolina State Attorney General, and the U.S. Solicitor General regarding the matter of Heien v. North Carolina. The question initially posed before the Court was whether a traffic stop premised on an officer’s mistaken understanding of a state statute violates the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights. But as arguments proceeded, the issue became much more complicated, leaving some Justices concerned that this case raises more serious implications than initially anticipated.

The defendant in this case was a passenger in his own vehicle as it was operated by a friend down an interstate highway in North Carolina. A highway patrol officer noticed that only one of the defendant’s two brake lights was functioning. While the state statute only requires that vehicles have only one functioning break light, the officer interpreted the statute incorrectly and stopped the defendant’s vehicle to issue a warning to the defendant. The defendant then consented to the officer’s request to search the vehicle. And after forty minutes, the officer discovered a plastic sandwich bag containing cocaine. The defendant was charged and convicted on the charge of trafficking cocaine.

ISSUES BEFORE THE COURT

Often times, what initially begins as a traffic stop for a civil offense (such as speeding) unexpectedly becomes an investigation into a criminal offense, ultimately leading to criminal charges. Under Fourth Amendment law, police officers conducting a traffic stop can investigate for criminal activity so long as the investigation was reasonably derived from the officer’s initial suspicion that a traffic offense had been committed. Very recently, the Illinois State Attorney General filed an appeal with the U.S. Supreme Court to determine whether an officer can continue to hold the defendant even after the officer’s initial suspicion had already dissipated.

The case of Illinois v. Cummings

The petition for appeal was filed under Illinois v. Derrick Cummings, earlier this past summer. This case arose out of a traffic stop where a driver was charged with operating a vehicle without a license. The officer who conducted the traffic stop testified that he initially suspected the vehicle registration had expired. But after running the registration number through the database, the officer discovered that the registration was not expired but that the car was registered under a woman who had an arrest warrant issued against her. The officer then pulled the vehicle over and approached the driver. The driver was not a woman, but was the defendant, Mr. Derrick Cummings.

DUI defense attorneys in Ohio have recently won a substantial victory in the Ohio Supreme Court that will allow defendants to bring stronger challenges to the validity of breathalyzer tests. The Ohio court’s decision will require states to comply with discovery requests by the defendant, and produce critical data and records relating to their breathalyzer devices.

In the case of Cincinnati v. Ilg, the defendant was questioned and tested for intoxication after he lost control of his vehicle and struck a fence, sign, and pole. The officer who responded to the accident administered a breath test using the state’s device, the Intoxilyzer 8000. The device revealed that the defendant had a BAC reading that was almost twice the legal limit. The defendant was subsequently charged with an OUI.

Before trial, the defendant’s attorneys requested that the prosecutor produce records of the defendant’s test, as well as test data, maintenance records, and results produced by the Intoxilyzer 8000 machine used to test the defendant. The purpose of this request was to compile enough evidence to demonstrate the inaccuracy of the defendant’s breath test on the night of the accident, and so to prevent his BAC results from being introduced in trial. The defendant requested records from his own test, as well as for tests conducted three years prior to his arrest, and three months following.

Under state statute (G.L. c. 90 § 24), all drivers in Massachusetts have a legal obligation to stop and identify themselves whenever they know that their vehicle has collided with another vehicle, property, or a person. If the driver collides with another person, leaving them dead or unconscious, the driver must stay at the scene and provide information to another motorist or officer, or leave the scene to find a telephone to report the accident to authorities. Failure to do so could result in license suspension or criminal offenses.

Other states, such as Georgia, also require drivers to provide injured parties “reasonable assistance,” including providing, or arranging for, transportation of the injured parties for medical attention. Under Georgia statutes OCGA 40-6-270, a driver could be charged with a felony hit-and-run for failing to provide such assistance. Another statute, OCGA 40-6-393, also allows for a driver who fails to stop as required under 40-6-270 to be charged with first degree vehicular homicide if he injures a person and that person subsequently dies. Under the second statutory provision, a person could be sentenced to up to 15 years in prison, in comparison to the five years under the hit-and-run provision.

The case of Henry v. State, heard by the Court of Appeals of Georgia, demonstrates the different legal issues that come into play in such hit-and-run cases. In Henry v. State, the defendant was operating a vehicle with a passenger down a public road in Georgia after midnight, when he struck two fourteen year-old boys walking in the grass along the road. The passenger testified that he felt an impact and saw one boy’s head hit the hood of the defendant’s pickup truck, and screamed to the defendant: “You just killed somebody. Stop Henry.” The passenger also testified that he was certain that this boy died on impact. Rather than stop to provide assistance as the statute requires, the defendant sped home and later abandoned the truck in a field with the intention of reporting it stolen.

In a recent hearing before the Bristol County Superior Court, Judge Garsh ruled that she will not be allowing the prosecutor to introduce evidence obtained during a police house search in the murder trial of former NFL player Aaron Hernandez. According to a local news reporter, the judge explained that the application for the warrant authorizing the search was defective, and so police had no authority to execute a search using that warrant.

Searching Aaron Hernandez’s Home

The warrant was for the search of Aaron Hernandez’s home in Franklin, MA. Law enforcement applied for a search warrant in order to seize the cell phone of Carlos Ortiz, a co-defendant of Hernandez in the Bristol County murder trial. And since the cell phone of Ortiz was known by authorities to be at Hernandez’s Franklin home, authorities applied for a warrant to search that location for the cell phone. During the search, police also seized several other pieces of evidence, including dozens of ammunition rounds for various firearms, lease and rental agreements under Hernandez’s name, receipts, mail and checks written to Hernandez, and even keys to a Hummer SUV.

The right of against unreasonable seizures in the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution is invoked frequently in the context of traffic stops, where officers temporarily “seize” a driver and his vehicle for questioning. It is established law, however, that an officer is only authorized to stop a vehicle where there the officer makes specific and articulable observations of the driver that lead him to reasonably suspect that the driver is operating unlawfully – such as while under the influence of alcohol. Where the officer arrests a driver under the pretense that the driver was operating under the influence without the officer being able to refer to specific articulable observations leading to his suspicion, the courts have ruled that the seizure or subsequent arrest is completely unlawful – regardless of whether the driver was in fact intoxicated.

The Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee’s recent decision in State v. Wild, is one such example. The court overturned a trial judge’s finding that an officer lawfully stopped a driver suspected of drunk driving because the State prosecutor was unable to establish that the officer truly had reasonable suspicion to seize the defendant.

The only evidence of suspicious activity that was offered by the prosecutor was the testimony of the police officer involved, along with one-minute’s worth of video footage from the officer’s cruiser camera. The officer explicitly testified that he did not remember any observations of the driver on the day of the incident, and deferred the trial court’s attention to the unclear camera footage and the officer’s statement that the defendant had crossed the lane multiple times, as the officer’s voice was recorded in the video. On this evidence alone, the trial court accepted the state’s argument that the defendant was in fact swerving or “straddling” across her lane after the court itself supplied more information as to the road design on its own accord, since the video footage was too unclear. Based on the video testimony and the trial judge’s own recollection of that road, the trial court found there to have been reasonable suspicion that the defendant was operating while under the influence. The Court of Appeals, however, completely disagreed.

The highest appellate court of Nebraska recently overruled a trial judge who allowed evidence of drunk driving to be admitted during trial, where that evidence was obtained as a result of an traffic stop based on an anonymous tip. Applying recent federal case law, the Nebraska Supreme Court found that the driver’s Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches and seizures was violated when the officer stopped the driver without first confirming the reliability of the anonymous 911 caller’s tip, or reasonably believing a crime was committed.

State v. Rodriguez

In the matter of State v. Rodriguez, a 911 dispatcher received an anonymous call alleging that the caller was just pushed out of a moving vehicle. The vehicle was identified as a green GMC Envoy heading westbound on Highway 26. An officer was dispatched to the location, where he observed a vehicle matching the description traveling westbound past the location of the caller. The officer followed the vehicle then activated his emergency lights and began to question the driver about the reported disturbance.

The Oregon Court of Appeals issued a decision prohibiting police officers from forcefully entering the home of an individual whom they believed operated a vehicle while intoxicated. Finding no emergency where the suspect was under the influence and had locked himself and his seven-year old child into their home, the Court ruled that the officers were required by the Fourth Amendment to obtain a warrant.

In the matter of State v. Sullivan, the defendant was observed by a clerk to be under the influence of alcohol while checking out of a grocery store with his seven-year-old son. The clerk followed the defendant out of the store and recorded the license plate number of the defendant’s vehicle. The clerk forwarded that information to police, which located the defendant’s home address and immediately responded.

An officer arrived at the defendant’s home address and observed the defendant’s car and a man yelling to a young boy in slurred speech. After the officer ordered the defendant to stop, the defendant pushed his son up the stairs of the apartment building, slammed the door shut, and closed the blinds in the apartment unit. The officer, joined by two other officers, immediately approached began to pound on the door to the apartment, but there was no response. After speaking with dispatch and his sergeant, the officer discovered that the defendant had a concealed weapons permit. He then received permission to forcefully enter the premises under the premise that the child’s safety was at risk. The officers then kicked the door down and drew their guns to enter the apartment .The defendant approached and was arrested, and subsequently refused to submit to a blood-alcohol test.

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