Massachusetts Criminal Defense Lawyer Blog

United States Supreme Court heard oral argument in Bullcoming v. New Mexico which could impact the admissibility of breathalyzer evidence in Massachusetts

March 3, 2011 | by Michael DelSignore

Bullcoming v. New Mexico raises a significant issue under the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause regarding scientific and blood test evidence in Massachusetts drunk driving cases with breathalyzer or blood test results. The State of New Mexico attempted to present evidence to prove the defendant’s blood alcohol content through a surrogate blood analyst who did not have any role in drawing the defendant’s blood.

The State argued that the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause was not violated because the blood test was a simple test that did not require the analyst to interpret results or exercise independent judgment. The National College of DUI Defense amicus brief, by Attorneys Justice McShane, Lenny Stamm and Ronald Moore, pointed out the scientific judgment and interpretation involved with blood test results.

The State argued in its brief that the Confrontation Clause is not implicated because the report was produced by a machine and a machine is not a witness under the Confrontation Clause. The State argued that the scientific evidence in Bullcoming did not qualify as testimonial because it was not prepared under oath and is not an affidavit or confession. The complete court filings in the case are contained on the Scotus Blog, click here.

United States Supreme Court diminishes right of confrontation in case of Michigan v. Bryant

February 28, 2011 | by Michael DelSignore

The United States Supreme Court’s decision in Michigan v. Bryant, decided today, diminishes the Sixth Amendment right of confrontation. The Court held that statements are nontestimonial and thus not covered by the Sixth Amendment confrontation clause when the primary purpose of the statement is to allow the police to respond to an ongoing emergency. The Court’s opinion represents a substantial departure from the Court’s recent cases of Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) and Melendez Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. __ (2009) both affirming that the Constitution requires face to face confrontation under the Sixth Amendment.

Four justices joined in this reasoning with Justice Thomas joining the majority based on the fact that the statement was not sufficiently formal to be testimonial. Accordingly, Justice Thomas defines the right of confrontation based on whether the statement is similar to the historical practices that the framers of the Constitution intended to curtail when drafting the confrontation clause.

The Bryant case is an unusual case as the police came upon a victim who was dying from a gun shot wound. The police asked the victim what happened and he identified the defendant as the shooter. The victim died, leaving his statements as the only evidence identifying the defendant is the shooter. The Court held that the circumstances of the emergency indicated that the primary purpose of the victim’s statement was to help the police respond to an ongoing emergency of capturing the assailant. The Court held that a person in the victim’s position would not have a purpose of identifying his shooter for future prosecution, but to assist the police in responding to the emergency. Further, the Court stressed that the primary purpose of the police was to respond to the medical emergency facing the victim. Additionally, the Court stated that the defendant’s medical condition and the informal nature of the questioning was relevant in determining the primary purpose of the statement.

United States Supreme Court declines to hear case raising the issue of whether Constitution requires unanimous jury verdict

February 23, 2011 | by Michael DelSignore

The United States Supreme Court declined to hear an appeal from Louisiana in the case of Barbour v. Louisiana which raises the issue of whether the Constitution requires a unanimous jury verdict to support a criminal conviction. Click on this link to read the filings from the case on the Scotus Blog.

Only two states Louisiana and Oregon allow a criminal conviction without a unanimous jury verdict. Massachusetts requires a unanimous jury verdict of all six jurors in district court and twelve jurors in superior court. Accordingly, if a Massachusetts criminal lawyer obtains a verdict that is not unanimous a mistrial results and the case can be brought to trial again.

The defendant in Barbour asserts that the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment require a unanimous jury verdict. The petitioner in the case is represented by Jeffrey L. Fisher. The petitioners argue that the United States Supreme Court should overrule its decision in Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972) where the United States Supreme Court held that the Constitution does not require a unanimous jury verdict.

Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court heard oral argument in Commonwealth v. Zeininger regarding admissibility of breathalyzer test results at DUI trial

February 11, 2011 | by Michael DelSignore

The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court heard oral arguments on February 7, 2011 in the case of Commonwealth v. Zeininger, which was an appeal of a drunk driving conviction out of the Greenfield District Court. The defendants in the case filed an appeal with the Massachusetts Court of Appeals, which the SJC took on its own motion for direct view. As a Massachusetts OUI attorney, this decision could have an important implications for attorney defending drunk driving cases.

The defendant made three challenges to the admissibility of the breathalyzer test results. First, the defendant challenged the evidence presented by the Commonwealth to show that the breathalyzer machine was certified. Under the Massachusetts Supreme Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Barbeau, 411 Mass. 782 (1992), in order to admit breathalyzer test results into evidence, the Commonwealth has to establish that the machine satisfies both the annual certification and the periodic testing requirements imposed by the Massachusetts regulation and the Barbeau decision.

The Commonwealth did not call a witness to prove the annual certification, but relied on the certification noted in the implied consent form. The implied consent form does not indicate who certified the breathalyzer testing machine. The Commonwealth can request a certification from the Office of Alcohol Testing, but it appears that the Commonwealth relied on the certification on the implied consent form rather than the full Office of Alcohol Testing documents that are certified by the Office of Alcohol Testing.

Comments on recent Appeals Court decision on the breathalyzer margin of error

February 6, 2011 | by Michael DelSignore

The Massachusetts Court of Appeals, in the case of Commonwealth v. Rumery, decided February 4, 2011, issued a decision regarding the margin of error of the breathalyzer at Massachusetts DUI trials. The court ruled that a defendant is not entitled to a jury instruction that the breathalyzer has an inherent margin of error of .01. The defendant sought this instruction because when the Office of Alcohol testing tests a breathalyzer devise for accuracy, the machine is considered accurate as long as the machine can read a solution with a known alcohol content within a range of plus or minus .01. The court held that the .01 does not represent any specific margin of error of any particular machine. The court noted that the Commonwealth contended that the margin of error is much smaller and the court appeared to accept that finding. It is unclear how the court can accept that finding given that the Office of Alcohol Testing does not require such precision when it is testing the machine for accuracy pursuant to the periodic testing mandated by Massachusetts DUI law.

The court also stated that the margin of error has already been accounted for as a result of taking the lower of the two samples. Finally, the court held that if an instruction on a margin of error were mandated, it would require complex expert testimony on the margin of error of each machine.

In the case before the court, the defendant’s breathalyzer reading was at the legal limit of .08; accordingly, the accuracy of the machine is central to the issue as the machine is determining whether the defendant is guilty of the offense of drunk driving. The Commonwealth should be required to prove the margin of error of the machine in case with readings at or near the legal limit.

As a Massachusetts OUI attorney, this decision will not have a major impact on the defense of breathalyzer cases near the legal limit as the court only held that a jury instruction was not required. A defendant is still permitted to argue that the margin of error of the breathalyzer machine is .01 based on how the Commonwealth conducts its periodic testing. Additionally, a defense lawyer can present other evidence that impacts the margin of error of the breathalyzer machine, such as temperature, the partition ratio and individual variation in providing a breathalyzer sample, including breath volume.
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Breathalyzer source code hearing in Massachusetts drunk driving cases denied by trial judge

February 5, 2011 | by Michael DelSignore

A Massachusetts trial judge, Mark Sullivan, in the case of Commonwealth v. Anthony Daen, denied the defendant’s request for a Daubert-Lanigan hearing in a group of Massachusetts drunk driving cases that were consolidated for the Honorable Judge Mark Sullivan out of the Lawrence District Court. The case involved 60 defendants charged with operating under the influence of alcohol where the defendants submitted to a breathalyzer test.

A Daubert-Lanigan hearing is hearing that a Massachusetts criminal attorney can request challenge the scientific reliability of expert testimony. When this hearing occurs, the Commonwealth presents its proposed scientific evidence to a judge prior to trial so that the judge can determine whether the evidence is sufficiently reliable for a jury to hear the evidence. If a judge finds that the evidence is not scientific reliable, it will be excluded from evidence.

Judge Sullivan ruled that the Daubert standard does not apply because the Massachusetts legislature made breathalyzer test results admissible by statute and devised a statutory scheme for the admissibility of breathalyzer test results. Accordingly, the judge ruled that a Daubert hearing is inapplicable because the test results are admissible under Massachusetts OUI law.

Bristol County District Attorney proposes having defendants sign waiver to allow criminal trials to proceed when defendants fail to appear in court

January 30, 2011 | by Michael DelSignore

Bristol County District Attorney Sam Sutter’s proposal to move trials forward even if the defendant fails to appear would be declared unconstitutional by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court. In an effort to decrease the number of defendant’s who fail to appear in court, the Bristol County District Attorney has proposed requiring defendants to sign waivers allowing trials to proceed without their appearance in the event of a default. This waiver would clearly be unconstitutional as courts indulge every presumption against waiver of constitutional rights. The so-called waiver for defendants that default would involve defendants waiving numerous constitutional rights, including the right to confront their accuser, right to testify, elect between a bench or jury trial and the right to effective assistance of counsel and a fair trial.

As a Fall River criminal lawyer, I can understand the frustration of the district attorney that cases cannot be resolved as a result of defendants failing to appear in court. However, District Attorney Sutter’s proposal is an unconstitutional and would ultimately be unworkable. First, a defendant should simply refuse to sign the so-called waiver form. It would be inappropriate for a judge to raise or set a higher bail based on the district attorney attempting to obtain a waiver of a defendant’s Constitutional rights.

As a Bristol County criminal lawyer, it would be inconceivable to have a trial without the defendant being present. First, there are certain fundamental decision that a criminal lawyer cannot make without consulting with the defendant, whether to proceed with a bench or jury trial and whether or not the defendant testifies. Clearly, allowing a trial to go forward without the defendant would deprive the defendant of the opportunity to testify and deny the defendant a fair trial. Further, there would be a natural tendency for the jury to find a defendant guilty based on the failure to appear as the jury would likely speculate as to the reason for the defendant not appearing.

United States Supreme Court decision limits the scope of federal habeas corpus relief of State court criminal convictions

January 29, 2011 | by Michael DelSignore

The United States Supreme Court, in the case of Harrington v. Richter, decided, January 19, 2011, held that a trial counsel was not ineffective under the federal habeas corpus statute, called the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, when his trial counsel did not pursue a defense involving forensic evidence. The opinion was written by Justice Kennedy with six judges joining in the opinion and Justice Ginsburg concurring in the judgment. The decision is notable for the extent to which the Court goes to narrow the scope of review under the federal habeas statute. The court stated that relief under the statute is only allowed when a state court decision is contrary to clearly established holding of federal law or it involves an unreasonable application of law. In addressing the claim, the court looked at whether the State court decision involved an unreasonable application of the United States Supreme Court decision on ineffective assistance of counsel, Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).

The Court held that determining whether the State’s court’s decision was an unreasonable application of Strickland is different from determining whether counsel performance was ineffective had the case came before it on direct appeal. Accordingly, the court held that federal habeas relief is precluded as long as fair minded judges may disagree and further emphasized the difficulty for a defendant satisfying this standard by holding that when the standard is general, the more leeway courts have in reaching different outcomes.

The United States Supreme Court criticized the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals for reviewing the case as if it came before it on direct review rather than under the differential standard of the federal habeas statute. The court stressed that federal habeas relief is meant to be a difficult standard to satisfy. The Court underscored that the statute protects against extreme malfunctions in the criminal process and not against error that may result on appeal. The court justified this holding under the rationale that it preserves the sovereign power of the States to punish criminal offenders.

United States Supreme Court to hear oral arguments in the case of Kentucky v. King addressing the Fourth Amendment Exigent Circumstance exception to the warrant requirement.

January 10, 2011 | by Michael DelSignore

On January 12, 2011, the United States Supreme Court will hear oral arguments in the case of Kentucky v. King. This case addresses the issue of what test should courts apply when police conduct creates the exigent circumstances relied on as the exception to the warrant requirement. The briefs in the case can be found on the Scotus blog. Additionally, there is an excellent commentary of Orin Kerr. Click here to read the article of Orin Kerr. The United States Supreme Court is reviewing a decision of the Kentucky Supreme Court, which can be read by clicking on this link.

I will be attending the oral arguments in this case as I am being sworn in as an attorney to practice before the United States Supreme Court. As a Massachusetts criminal attorney, it will be a great honor to be in attendance for such an important oral argument that impacts criminal law. I will posted my impressions of the argument on this blog.

In the King case, an undercover police officer bought drugs from a suspect in an apartment hallway. The suspect went into an apartment; however, there were two apartments and the officers did not know which one the suspect entered. The facts of the case indicate there were two apartments one on the left and the other the right of the hallway. From the left apartment, the police smelled marijuana, knocked on the door of the left apartment, announced their presence and entered the apartment without a warrant. While waiting outside, the police heard movement in the apartment and believe that evidence was being destroyed and as a result the police enter the apartment and seize narcotics.

Brockton, Massachusetts criminal defense lawyer comments on recent decision involving Miranda warnings from the Florida Supreme Court.

January 1, 2011 | by Michael DelSignore

As a Brockton Criminal defense lawyer, a recent case from the Florida Supreme Court raises significant issues regarding when and how police must provide Miranda warnings under the Constitution. The case of Ross v. State, is a case where the defendant was convicted of first degree murder of his parents and sentenced to death. A key component of the State’s evidence was the defendant’s confession to the murder. The Florida Supreme Court reversed the conviction and ordered a new trial holding that the police violated the defendant’s rights under Miranda by not providing him Miranda warnings until after he made a confession; the defendant was then given Miranda warnings and again made inculpatory statements. The State of Florida has filed a petition for certiorari with the United States Supreme Court in order to attempt to reverse the decision of the Florida Supreme Court and uphold the jury verdict. The filings in the Ross case can be found on the Scotusblog.

As a Massachusetts criminal defense lawyer, the Ross decision is noteworthy in several respects. The court found the defendant first inculpatory statement custodial applying the test articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Yarborough v. Alvardo, 541 U.S. 652 (2004) where the court looks to the circumstances surrounding the interrogation and whether a reasonable person would have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave.

In a Massachusetts criminal case involving an issue of a custodial interrogation, the court would apply the factors set forth in the case of Commonwealth v. Bryant, 390 Mass. 729 (1984).

1. the place of the interrogation
2. Whether the investigation has begun to focus on the suspect 3. The nature of the interrogation whether it was aggressive or, instead, informal and influenced in its contours by the suspect; and
4. whether, at the time the incriminating statement was made, the suspect was free to end the interview by leaving the locus of the interrogation as evidenced by whether the interview ended with the arrest of the defendant.

The Florida court applied a similar test and found that all of the factors favored a custodial interrogation in that the defendant had to endure a long interrogation where he was confronted with evidence of his guilt in a highly confrontational manner without having the benefit of Miranda warnings prior to his confession.

After obtaining an incriminatory statement, the defendant was provided Miranda warning and subsequently made a second incriminatory statement. To determine whether this statement was admissible the Florida Supreme Court applied the case of Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985) and Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004), both from the United States Supreme Court.

The Elstad case addresses the issue of a statement prior to Miranda warnings followed by the police providing the warnings and then the defendant making a second incriminatory statement and would allow the second statement into evidence if a careful and thorough administration of the Miranda warnings is given and the rights are waived. This rule of allowing a late administration of the Miranda warning to be cured applies only if the police do not intentionally delay providing Miranda warnings to obtain an incriminatory statement. The Florida court found it significant in its analysis that the police downplayed the importance of the Miranda warnings in order to compel the defendant to repeat his earlier confession. The Florida Supreme Court concluded that the later statements could not be admitted into evidence because the delay in giving the Miranda warnings was designed by the police and the police downplayed the significance of the warnings once given.
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