Massachusetts Criminal Defense Lawyer Blog

Rhode Island Legislator Charged with Drunk Driving, Possession of Marijuana, at Sobriety Checkpoint

April 27, 2011 | by Michael DelSignore

A Rhode Island lawmaker has been charged with driving under the influence and possession of marijuana and drug paraphernalia after being stopped at a DUI checkpoint in Connecticut, Channel 12 News reported.

A Massachusetts criminal defense lawyer has more ground upon which to challenge charges that result from a car stop at a sobriety checkpoint. These stops infringe upon your Fourth Amendment rights to be free from unreasonable search and seizure.

Massachusetts sobriety checkpoints and law enforcement roadblocks in Connecticut are permitted under state law, though law enforcement must obey strict rules regarding the checkpoint’s operation to ensure everyone is treated equally. The training of officers involved, the probable cause to request that you submit to field sobriety testing or a breathalyzer examination and the probable cause for any search of your vehicle or person are all issues a defense attorney may challenge in defending a client charged as a result of a DUI checkpoint.

Roadblocks in Rhode Island have been deemed unconstitutional and are not permitted under the state constitution.

House Minority Leader Robert Watson, R-East Greenwich-West Greenwich, was among those arrested Friday at a checkpoint in East Haven Connecticut. NBC 10 News reports Watson is expected to keep his leadership position despite the arrest after Republican House members voted unanimously to support him.

Watson denied failing the field sobriety tests and stated that he wished there were cameras. In many cases, a driver charged with DUI in Massachusetts will dispute the version of the police contained in the police report. Many motorists are upset when reading the police which often is inaccurate, exaggerates what occurred and distorts innocent activity to justify the arrest. According to the police report, the officer observed only three clues on the nine step walk and turn out of a total of eight clues. While the officer concluded Watson failed, his DUI lawyer will be able to use this test to show that he had normal balance, coordination and mental ability given the substantial number of things he did correct in performing the test.

The Providence Journal reported Watson was flagged over while driving his Ford Ranger. Police report that he smelled of alcohol and marijuana. A bag of suspected marijuana and a wood pipe were found upon a search of the vehicle.

A test of his blood-alcohol level at the station was .05, below the legal limit of .08. However, the presence of marijuana could complicate the case as prosecutors could argue he was driving under the influence of drugs as well as alcohol.

In Massachusetts, there is a presumption that a driver is not under the influence if a breathalyzer reading is .05 or below. If the breathalyzer reading is .06 or .07, the Commonwealth may still charge a motorist with DUI and will proceed under an impairment theory. Most cases of under .06 and .07 result in not guilty verdicts after a bench trial. However, when there is allegations of driving under the influence of drugs, the Commonwealth may charge OUI drugs in the alternative.
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Massachusetts Appeals Court addresses Identification issue in appeal from Wrentham District Court Open and Gross Lewdness Conviction

April 24, 2011 | by Michael DelSignore

As a Massachusetts criminal defense lawyer, the

Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court holds that smell of burnt marijuana is insufficient to justify an exit order

April 19, 2011 | by Michael DelSignore

The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court addressed an important legal issues that arose once the Massachusetts legislature decriminalized simple possession of under one ounce of marijuana. Does the smell of burnt marijuana justify an order that a motorist exit a motor vehicle. In the case of Commonwealth v. Cruz, decided April 19, 2011, the SJC held that the smell of burnt marijuana alone does not justify an exit order.

The Cruz case involved the following facts. The defendant was a passenger in a car parked in front of a fire hydrant. The windows were rolled down in the car and the officers could see the driver light a cigar known to mask the smell of marijuana. The officers recognized the defendant and testified at the motion to suppress hearing that they saw the defendant smoking marijuana earlier in the day. Significantly, the defendant was not known to the officers as a dangerous person and even was counseled by one of the officers to “do more than hang out.” The driver was unknown to the officers. The officers further testified at the motion hearing that the defendant was smoking a cigar, that they could smell an odor of burnt marijuana and that the driver appeared nervous. The defendant and the driver were ordered out of the car.

In finding the exit order improper under Article 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, the court stressed that by decriminalizing possession of under an ounce of marijuana the voters changed the status of the offense, meaning that the voters intended possession of marijuana under an ounce to be treated different from other serious drug crimes. Accordingly, the SJC concluded that the changed status of the offense implicates police conduct and requires some additional facts other than the smell of burnt marijuana to justify an exit order.

Under Massachusetts law, police must have a basis to support an exit order under Article 14 of the Declaration of Rights. An exit order is permissible in Massachusetts in one of three circumstances:

1. The police have a reasonable belief that their safety is in danger;
2. The officer has reasonable suspicion that the defendant is committing a criminal offense, other than a traffic violation.
3. The officer can order a defendant from the car if there is a legal basis for a warrantless search of the vehicle under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement.

Massachusetts provides greater protections to citizens under Article 14 than under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution as under the Fourth Amendment as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court, the police do not need any basis to order a motorist from the vehicle.

In Cruz, the Commonwealth argued that the exit order was justified based on the officer’s belief that the defendant was engaged in criminal activity. The SJC held that there were no facts that would support the conclusion that a criminal amount of narcotics were in the vehicle. Further, the court rejected the reasoning of other State courts finding probable cause to believe a vehicle has any quantity of marijuana is sufficient to justify a warrantless search based on the likely presence of other contraband. In rejecting these other State court decisions, the SJC stressed that the standard to determine the validity of a warrantless search is the same used by a magistrate issuing a warrant. Applying this reasoning, the SJC concluded that under the facts of the case a magistrate could not issue a search warrant.
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United States Supreme Court heard oral argument in Bullcoming v. New Mexico which could impact the admissibility of breathalyzer evidence in Massachusetts

March 3, 2011 | by Michael DelSignore

Bullcoming v. New Mexico raises a significant issue under the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause regarding scientific and blood test evidence in Massachusetts drunk driving cases with breathalyzer or blood test results. The State of New Mexico attempted to present evidence to prove the defendant’s blood alcohol content through a surrogate blood analyst who did not have any role in drawing the defendant’s blood.

The State argued that the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause was not violated because the blood test was a simple test that did not require the analyst to interpret results or exercise independent judgment. The National College of DUI Defense amicus brief, by Attorneys Justice McShane, Lenny Stamm and Ronald Moore, pointed out the scientific judgment and interpretation involved with blood test results.

The State argued in its brief that the Confrontation Clause is not implicated because the report was produced by a machine and a machine is not a witness under the Confrontation Clause. The State argued that the scientific evidence in Bullcoming did not qualify as testimonial because it was not prepared under oath and is not an affidavit or confession. The complete court filings in the case are contained on the Scotus Blog, click here.

United States Supreme Court diminishes right of confrontation in case of Michigan v. Bryant

February 28, 2011 | by Michael DelSignore

The United States Supreme Court’s decision in Michigan v. Bryant, decided today, diminishes the Sixth Amendment right of confrontation. The Court held that statements are nontestimonial and thus not covered by the Sixth Amendment confrontation clause when the primary purpose of the statement is to allow the police to respond to an ongoing emergency. The Court’s opinion represents a substantial departure from the Court’s recent cases of Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) and Melendez Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. __ (2009) both affirming that the Constitution requires face to face confrontation under the Sixth Amendment.

Four justices joined in this reasoning with Justice Thomas joining the majority based on the fact that the statement was not sufficiently formal to be testimonial. Accordingly, Justice Thomas defines the right of confrontation based on whether the statement is similar to the historical practices that the framers of the Constitution intended to curtail when drafting the confrontation clause.

The Bryant case is an unusual case as the police came upon a victim who was dying from a gun shot wound. The police asked the victim what happened and he identified the defendant as the shooter. The victim died, leaving his statements as the only evidence identifying the defendant is the shooter. The Court held that the circumstances of the emergency indicated that the primary purpose of the victim’s statement was to help the police respond to an ongoing emergency of capturing the assailant. The Court held that a person in the victim’s position would not have a purpose of identifying his shooter for future prosecution, but to assist the police in responding to the emergency. Further, the Court stressed that the primary purpose of the police was to respond to the medical emergency facing the victim. Additionally, the Court stated that the defendant’s medical condition and the informal nature of the questioning was relevant in determining the primary purpose of the statement.

United States Supreme Court declines to hear case raising the issue of whether Constitution requires unanimous jury verdict

February 23, 2011 | by Michael DelSignore

The United States Supreme Court declined to hear an appeal from Louisiana in the case of Barbour v. Louisiana which raises the issue of whether the Constitution requires a unanimous jury verdict to support a criminal conviction. Click on this link to read the filings from the case on the Scotus Blog.

Only two states Louisiana and Oregon allow a criminal conviction without a unanimous jury verdict. Massachusetts requires a unanimous jury verdict of all six jurors in district court and twelve jurors in superior court. Accordingly, if a Massachusetts criminal lawyer obtains a verdict that is not unanimous a mistrial results and the case can be brought to trial again.

The defendant in Barbour asserts that the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment require a unanimous jury verdict. The petitioner in the case is represented by Jeffrey L. Fisher. The petitioners argue that the United States Supreme Court should overrule its decision in Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972) where the United States Supreme Court held that the Constitution does not require a unanimous jury verdict.

Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court heard oral argument in Commonwealth v. Zeininger regarding admissibility of breathalyzer test results at DUI trial

February 11, 2011 | by Michael DelSignore

The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court heard oral arguments on February 7, 2011 in the case of Commonwealth v. Zeininger, which was an appeal of a drunk driving conviction out of the Greenfield District Court. The defendants in the case filed an appeal with the Massachusetts Court of Appeals, which the SJC took on its own motion for direct view. As a Massachusetts OUI attorney, this decision could have an important implications for attorney defending drunk driving cases.

The defendant made three challenges to the admissibility of the breathalyzer test results. First, the defendant challenged the evidence presented by the Commonwealth to show that the breathalyzer machine was certified. Under the Massachusetts Supreme Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Barbeau, 411 Mass. 782 (1992), in order to admit breathalyzer test results into evidence, the Commonwealth has to establish that the machine satisfies both the annual certification and the periodic testing requirements imposed by the Massachusetts regulation and the Barbeau decision.

The Commonwealth did not call a witness to prove the annual certification, but relied on the certification noted in the implied consent form. The implied consent form does not indicate who certified the breathalyzer testing machine. The Commonwealth can request a certification from the Office of Alcohol Testing, but it appears that the Commonwealth relied on the certification on the implied consent form rather than the full Office of Alcohol Testing documents that are certified by the Office of Alcohol Testing.

Comments on recent Appeals Court decision on the breathalyzer margin of error

February 6, 2011 | by Michael DelSignore

The Massachusetts Court of Appeals, in the case of Commonwealth v. Rumery, decided February 4, 2011, issued a decision regarding the margin of error of the breathalyzer at Massachusetts DUI trials. The court ruled that a defendant is not entitled to a jury instruction that the breathalyzer has an inherent margin of error of .01. The defendant sought this instruction because when the Office of Alcohol testing tests a breathalyzer devise for accuracy, the machine is considered accurate as long as the machine can read a solution with a known alcohol content within a range of plus or minus .01. The court held that the .01 does not represent any specific margin of error of any particular machine. The court noted that the Commonwealth contended that the margin of error is much smaller and the court appeared to accept that finding. It is unclear how the court can accept that finding given that the Office of Alcohol Testing does not require such precision when it is testing the machine for accuracy pursuant to the periodic testing mandated by Massachusetts DUI law.

The court also stated that the margin of error has already been accounted for as a result of taking the lower of the two samples. Finally, the court held that if an instruction on a margin of error were mandated, it would require complex expert testimony on the margin of error of each machine.

In the case before the court, the defendant’s breathalyzer reading was at the legal limit of .08; accordingly, the accuracy of the machine is central to the issue as the machine is determining whether the defendant is guilty of the offense of drunk driving. The Commonwealth should be required to prove the margin of error of the machine in case with readings at or near the legal limit.

As a Massachusetts OUI attorney, this decision will not have a major impact on the defense of breathalyzer cases near the legal limit as the court only held that a jury instruction was not required. A defendant is still permitted to argue that the margin of error of the breathalyzer machine is .01 based on how the Commonwealth conducts its periodic testing. Additionally, a defense lawyer can present other evidence that impacts the margin of error of the breathalyzer machine, such as temperature, the partition ratio and individual variation in providing a breathalyzer sample, including breath volume.
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Breathalyzer source code hearing in Massachusetts drunk driving cases denied by trial judge

February 5, 2011 | by Michael DelSignore

A Massachusetts trial judge, Mark Sullivan, in the case of Commonwealth v. Anthony Daen, denied the defendant’s request for a Daubert-Lanigan hearing in a group of Massachusetts drunk driving cases that were consolidated for the Honorable Judge Mark Sullivan out of the Lawrence District Court. The case involved 60 defendants charged with operating under the influence of alcohol where the defendants submitted to a breathalyzer test.

A Daubert-Lanigan hearing is hearing that a Massachusetts criminal attorney can request challenge the scientific reliability of expert testimony. When this hearing occurs, the Commonwealth presents its proposed scientific evidence to a judge prior to trial so that the judge can determine whether the evidence is sufficiently reliable for a jury to hear the evidence. If a judge finds that the evidence is not scientific reliable, it will be excluded from evidence.

Judge Sullivan ruled that the Daubert standard does not apply because the Massachusetts legislature made breathalyzer test results admissible by statute and devised a statutory scheme for the admissibility of breathalyzer test results. Accordingly, the judge ruled that a Daubert hearing is inapplicable because the test results are admissible under Massachusetts OUI law.

Bristol County District Attorney proposes having defendants sign waiver to allow criminal trials to proceed when defendants fail to appear in court

January 30, 2011 | by Michael DelSignore

Bristol County District Attorney Sam Sutter’s proposal to move trials forward even if the defendant fails to appear would be declared unconstitutional by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court. In an effort to decrease the number of defendant’s who fail to appear in court, the Bristol County District Attorney has proposed requiring defendants to sign waivers allowing trials to proceed without their appearance in the event of a default. This waiver would clearly be unconstitutional as courts indulge every presumption against waiver of constitutional rights. The so-called waiver for defendants that default would involve defendants waiving numerous constitutional rights, including the right to confront their accuser, right to testify, elect between a bench or jury trial and the right to effective assistance of counsel and a fair trial.

As a Fall River criminal lawyer, I can understand the frustration of the district attorney that cases cannot be resolved as a result of defendants failing to appear in court. However, District Attorney Sutter’s proposal is an unconstitutional and would ultimately be unworkable. First, a defendant should simply refuse to sign the so-called waiver form. It would be inappropriate for a judge to raise or set a higher bail based on the district attorney attempting to obtain a waiver of a defendant’s Constitutional rights.

As a Bristol County criminal lawyer, it would be inconceivable to have a trial without the defendant being present. First, there are certain fundamental decision that a criminal lawyer cannot make without consulting with the defendant, whether to proceed with a bench or jury trial and whether or not the defendant testifies. Clearly, allowing a trial to go forward without the defendant would deprive the defendant of the opportunity to testify and deny the defendant a fair trial. Further, there would be a natural tendency for the jury to find a defendant guilty based on the failure to appear as the jury would likely speculate as to the reason for the defendant not appearing.